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Abstract: 
Conceptualising the ongoing conflict over GM versus non-GM crops in the frame of property 
rights one can see that economic valorisation dynamics and aspirations are working on both 
sides, within two differently evolving agri-food paradigms, with biotechnology companies 
propagating intellectual property rights on seeds and crops within a productivist strategy, and 
with retailer chains, NGOs, farmer associations claiming generic names and labels as public 
property rights on identity preserved crops within a consumerist strategy. The analysis shows 
that the direction and strength of the dynamics depends much on the physical intricacies and 
the social relations which are implicated in these two types of intangible property. As the de­
velopment of the intangible property rights lies at the heart of postindustrial knowledge eco­
nomies, the study of the GM conflict is also instructive for understanding social change in the 
agri-food sector and in the society more generally. 
Keywords: GM crops; non GM crops; identity preservation; intellectual property rights; 
brand property rights; intangible property; knowledge society; postindustrial society; 
consumerism; public property; agricultural governance; agri-food systems; agri-food 
paradigms; value chain analysis; traceability; geographical indications
Acknowledgements
The research for this article was facilitated by a research grant of the Deutsche Forschungsgemein­
schaft which financed the meetings of the Rural Property Research Network. I gratefully aknow­
ledge many interesting and stimulating discussions within this network, most notably with Thomas 
Sikor, Marianne Penker, Lutz Laschewski, Bertram Turner and Chris Hann. Particularly Johannes 
Stahl, Christian Schleyer, Dik Roth, and Johannes Schubert contributed with many comments on a 
prior version of this paper. I want to thank also  Les Levidow and the anonymous reviewers for 
helpful advices to the latest version. It goes without saying that the responsibility for all remaining 
shortcomings rests with the author.
Postindustrial Knowledge Economies confront us with a new type of property which may be termed 
as  "immaterial"  or "intangible".  To be sure,  GM and identity  preserved non-GM crops are not 
immaterial, but their crucial aspects are mainly based on knowledge work and the manipulation of 
symbols, whereas their "material" aspects – that they have to be planted, grown and harvested by 
manual or mechanical labour – are becoming more trivial. Speaking more generally, one may say 
that any production of goods for the market is based firstly on a cognitive recipe or working plan, 
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demand  side  by  the  consumer.  During  the  Industrial  Age  the  second,  the  "material"  step  was 
central: Manual or mechanical labour was mobilized by large firms, and infrastructures for mass 
markets were established. Inventions and technical skills had been salient already in these times, 
and patents and professional titles had been introduced correspondingly. But in general there was 
not yet so much stress on the private appropriation and protection of knowledge. The recognition 
process  too  had  become  more  relevant  already  with  the  change  from  subsistence  to  market 
economies, and trade marks had been introduced since the end of the 19th century respectively. But 
as long as mass products governed the market, branding was not as crucial as it is today. Insofar, 
Postindustrial Economies are not really "post", but with manual labour replaced by mechanisation 
or production processes otherwise relocated to low wage regions,  the first  and third step – the 
"immaterial" stages – are rendered salient in the value adding chain (cf. Bell 1973; Drucker 1994; 
Castells 1998; Hardt/Negri 2000).
Agricultural growing of plants and animals has undergone and is still undergoing a rather similar 
process (with the difference that it is not necessarily organised in large firms): The production as 
such is  being mechanised  or  otherwise relocated to cheap labour settings (also in the sense of 
migrant labour import), whereas the biotechnological breeding of hightech species on the one side, 
and the marketing and branding on the other side of the farm have become the focus of new value 
adding efforts (Evenson et al. 2002; Morgan et al. 2006). New plant and animal varieties had been 
of concern all  through the industrialisation of agriculture,  but research was done mainly in the 
public domain, corresponding with rather loose Intellectual Property Rights leaving much room for 
breeders and farmers reusing the traits for further breeding and cultivation. During the last 20 years, 
Research and Development in general has shifted more to private business, and with the advent of 
biotechnology this is especially true for plant breeding which is now concentrated and vertically 
integrated into large biotech companies. Intellectual Property Rights correspondingly are taking a 
stronger  grip  on  (still  independent)  breeders  and farmers,  making  them pay patent  fees  to  the 
biotech  companies  not  only  once,  but  also  in  all  following  circumstances  of  breeding  and 
cultivation (Santaniello et al. 2000). Furthermore, as GM plants are being seen as risky in several 
aspects, biotechnology companies are trying to enforce regulations on farmers to avoid liability for 
the GM traits, thus making farmers in this respect to contract labourers of their companies. These 
features notably apply to the United States with its strong biotech industry, with a stark interest as 
an agricultural mass production exporter, and with a bold will to tighten Intellectual Property Rights 
both nationally and internationally. 
Branding  efforts  on  the  other  side  of  the  chain  are  relatively  new,  at  least  as  it  influences 
agriculture directly. Products of the food processor industry have been branded since long ago, but 
this did not apply to trace the raw materials (Teuteberg 1987). These had been handled as bulk 
commodities without taking much care of varieties and origin. The exception had always been the 
production and distribution of quality wine with its strongly controlled identification of producers, 
grapes, regions and even vineyards (Bérard/Marchenay 1995; Bessière 1998). With more affluent 
consumers, wine seems to be a model now for other retracing processes embracing cheese, beer, 
coffee, meet etc. The motives to purchase "natural" and "biological" labelled products may be often 
less hedonistic and more ascetic, based on "green" models of health and the environment (Barlösius 
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ascetic branding are rather similar, insofar as former bulk commodities become now differentiated 
and have to be segregated throughout the production and distribution chain following the general 
trend from a fordistic to a postfordistic consumption paradigm (Harvey 1990). Identity preserved 
non-GM crops are no exemption here. Economically seen the labelling process splits the market, 
attributing value to the non-GM crop. The property conflict is whether who owns the generic name 
"corn"  or  "canola"  or  "wheat",  the  GM  or  the  non-GM  producers,  and  who  has  to  bear  the 
segregation and labelling costs accordingly (Gray et al. 2004). In the European Union and Japan, 
mandatory labelling for GM was introduced and this can be seen as economically prudent for these 
nations. Again, the farmers as the material producers are not in the driver's seat, but object to the 
symbolic recognition of non-GM versus GM crops which is negotiated between retailers, NGOs and 
authorities and conforming to their cultural  models of "nature",  food and the environment (Gill 
2003). 
So, my thesis here is, that the worldwide dispute we face over GM versus non-GM crops can be 
seen as a battle between two types of "immaterial" property rights with their respective implications 
and intricacies. These two property aspirations are entering the farming ground from both sides of 
the  value  adding  chain:  The  Intellectual  Property  Rights  (IPR)  are  penetrating  "from  below", 
literally  through  the  seeds,  the  Brand Property  Rights  (BPR)  "from above",  through  consumer 
demand which is mediated by retailer chain strategies and market access regulations (see figure 1). 
These property strategies are not restricted to GM versus non-GM products alone. More generally 
they are involved in different agri-food systems, the conventional productivist bulk paradigm and 
the  newly  emerging  consumerist  quality  paradigm.  But  also  beyond  the  food  sector  they  are 
embedded  in  wider  processes  of  socio-economical  strategies  and  evolutions.  The  campaign  to 
tighten  Intellectual  Property  Rights  comprises  not  only  biotech  products  or  seeds  but  also 
pharmaceuticals,  software,  music,  books  and so  on,  or  more  generally  spoken,  it  embraces  all 
products which either get a larger input of intellectual  work than before or which may now be 
copied more easily with the help of novel mechanical or electronical devices (Meier 2005; Lessig 
2004). The increasing influence of consumer brands,  labels  and trademarks and their branching 
backward deeply into the value adding chain is not limited to food but encompasses all layers of the 
market where either functional quality depends on selected primary products or where a (credibly) 
guaranteed origin of the raw materials may enhance the image of the goods (Morgan et al. 2006; 
Ondersteijn et al. 2006). Thus the conflict is not only about the fate of biotech crops, agricultural 
strategies  and  rural  livelihoods,  but  also  influenced  by  and  representative  for  postindustrial 
developments in general (Klein 2000; Smith 1997). Thus the conflict seems representative for the 
contradiction between the neoliberal tendency to more purely developed, nationally and socially 
dis-embedded markets on the one side and  the postfordistic search for quality commodities which 
are necessarily based on vertically integrated social networks along global value adding chains on 
the other (Hall/Soskice 2001; Gill 2007). Methodologically spoken my argument is based on an 
Economic Sociology analysis of property rights' and commodity forms' articulations (Callon et al. 
2002;  Miller  2002)  within  a  political  economic  framework  of  the  global  food  value  chain 
development (Ondersteijn et al. 2006). 
To develop the argument, at first I will concentrate on established property concepts and discuss 
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non-GM labels in particular.  Next I  will  analyse  the implications  and intricacies  of Intellectual 
Property Rights when introducing biotech crops, focusing my observations mainly on the United 
States and Canada where strong biotech industries are placed and where large scale introduction of 
GM crops started. But a second look will go also to Argentina and China: To Argentina, because 
farmers grow there GM crops mostly without paying patent royalties. To China, because it develops 
its own biotech research and may become a strong competitor to the US based biotech industries, 
particularly in other Developing Countries. My analysis will then turn to the European Union with 
its consumer demand for non-GM food, the development of its market access regulations, its formal 
and informal  growing restrictions  against  GM crops  and its  establishment  of  formal  "GM-free 
zones". Finally I will discuss the future perspectives of the two property strategies which already 
clashed in global arenas, mainly in the World Trade Organisation. My tentative guess will be that 
the branding strategy may prove  rather successful in the long run because the (bundled) consumer 
demand becomes  ever  stronger  through postindustrial  economics  which  are  shifting  the  market 
power to the end of the global value adding chain. 
Figure 1: Intangible property rights trying to enter the farm from both sides of the value chain
Property Rights in General 
Taking "property" as the focal point of analysis puts stress on the explication of the term. Property 
is seen here as the legal right and the factual ability to use, transform and regulate access to the 
property  object  (see  Ostrom/Schlager  1996  for  more  detail).  The  right  of  alienation  is  not 
necessarily included in my definition since then it would not apply to generic names and labels. 
As indicated above one may differentiate between several types of property objects. Property in 
land, buildings and infrastructure is in-movable, thus conferring its holder a fix place within a social 
and  ecological  environment  with  corresponding  rights  and  obligations.  Real  property  is 
distinguished  in  common  law  from  "personal  property"  which  means  movables  such  as  cars, 
furniture,  food and so  on.  Since  most  of  our  explicit  transactions  concern  these  movables  our 
everyday  notions  of  property  in  general  are  constituted  (and  misled)  by  this  special  and  most 
unproblematic  form.  The  third  form is  "incorporeal"  or  "intangible  property"  which  had  been 
referred to above also as "immaterial" and which is of most concern here in the form of intellectual 
property  and of  brand property.  The  legal  profession  uses  the  term "intangible  property"  quite 
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5comprehensively also for debts and bonds, but as indicated above we want to bother only about the 
the real economy and not financial titles and instruments. "Intellectual property" is often used as a 
term which includes "brand property", but as we will see in the discussion below, there are a lot of 
distinctive features which demand the separation of the two categories under the roof of "intangible 
property". 
We have to  distinguish further  different  types  of  property control.  Private  ownership  means 
property in the hands of individuals or corporate entities. Common or public property means that 
the  property  object  is  controlled  by  a  collective  body  with  generic  regional  or  functional 
participation as e.g. regions or professional associations. Public control should not be confounded 
with  open access, which means the absence of property responsibilities and property rights (Ostrom 
1999). 
To understand the intricacies of property rights more accurately one should further distinguish 
different layers of the handling of property rights (Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006). The most general 
layer  may be termed as ideological  in the sense that  there are general  frameworks and general 
legitimations about the question which property objects (immovables, material goods, intangibles) 
should be held in which form of control (private, common, open). More specific is then the legal 
layer  which defines the bundles of rights  and responsibilities  in  much more detail.  But  on this 
second layer one has to take into account that there often exits legal pluralism in the sense that the 
authority and the boundaries of different legal bodies and customary rights may compete, so that 
international, national, regional, functional, traditional fora may coexist and contradict each other. 
This is of particular concern for intangible property rights because they are as ubiquitous as the 
informational resonance of the property objects whereas the property in things or land is always 
localized and therefore in principal subject of the regionally authoritative jurisdiction. The third and 
most concrete layer is constituted by the socio-ecological relations in which the property object and 
its  control  are  embedded and from which the articulation of responsibilities  and rights  actually 
depends – a fact which is often neglected by economists and jurists who take the abstract normative 
forms of the first or second layer for granted. But in reality the execution of property rights depends 
on at least four interrelated practical dimensions:
- The social relations between different potential property holders and other peoples concerned 
may either endorse, transform or prevent the realisation of property rights. This is particularly 
true in situations where individuals, firms or other collectives have established networks of 
bonds such as e.g. kinship ties or joint ventures. 
- The economic cost-benefits relation makes the property object valuable or worthless to the 
holder and either helps or prevents him to  claim his rights and to take the corresponding 
responsibilities. 
- The physical and technological practicalities not only influence the possible economic and 
symbolic profits directly, but also affect the excludability of the property objects against open 
access.In addition, they determine the side effects on other property functions and on other 
actors e.g. health or environmental concerns. 
- The symbolic links and cognitive associations render either the property object itself or its 
side effects valuable or undesirable in different social arenas and cultural contexts. 
Intricacies of Intangible Property
These three layers of property rights (ideological, legal, practical) will build the analytical frame for 
6the studies of IPR and BPR in the following sections. But first we have to clarify the concept of 
"intangible property".  The term "Intellectual property rights" is often used in jurisprudence in a 
rather comprehensive sense embracing also "Brand property rights". But from the perspective of 
Economic  Sociology  there  is  a  clear  reason  to  differentiate  between  the  two  types  under  the 
common roof of "intangible property": Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) relate to the knowledge 
work of creators such as artists or scientists and mediate transaction between knowledge producers 
by  attributing  and  protecting  authorship.  The  IPR's  welfare  rationale  is  to  give  a  moral  and 
economic incentive for the investment in creative work. Brand Property Rights (BPR) denote the 
communication work that is done to mediate the transfer between distributors and consumers. The 
primary welfare function of BPR is to identify characteristics of goods and services such as quality 
and  origin  which  would  be  otherwise  hidden  to  the  consumer.  This  function  is  fulfilled  by 
protecting reputable origins, companies and production processes against plagiarism thus defending 
investments  in  authenticity  and  quality  control.  Correspondingly  also  the  complications  and 
legitimation problems for private IPRs and BPRs are not the same.1
Private IPRs – and particularly the present efforts to make them more restrictive – are sharply 
debated among economists, industry associations and public activists for several reasons (cf. Arrow 
1962; Nelson 1992; Kelly 1998):
- Almost all  creative work emerges from open communication processes making individual 
authorship  in  most  cases  highly  debatable.  This  applies  also  to  seeds  because  these  are 
comprising  genetic  traits  which  have  been  cultivated  over  hundreds  of  years  by  many 
generations of farmers and later on by many different professional breeders. 
- In contrast to land and material movables, IP is non-rival in its use: The content (in contrast to 
the material copy) of a book is not spoilt by reading it. Its value may even be increasing the 
larger the resonance and discussion it finds among readers – this is called network effect. The 
function of property rights to allocate and discipline the use of scarce resources does not 
apply because there is no scarcity and network effects may even been impeded by exclusion 
measures. For seeds the aspect of non-rivalry applies but has some scale restrictions, because 
large monocultures might prove ecologically damaging. 
- The returns on investments in IP are highly uncertain. On the one hand the investor does not 
know whether  an  invention  is  near  or  very  far  away.  On the  other,  he  or  she  might  be 
leapfrogged by a  competitor.  Therefore  critiques,  e.g.  in  the  pharmaceutical  sector,  often 
throw  into  doubt  the  willingness  of  private  companies  to  invest  really  and  not  only 
rhetorically into path breaking innovations, particularly since time horizons for "returns on 
investment"  have  been  shortened  in  the  new times  of  the  "shareholder  capitalism".  This 
challenge  may also  apply  to  the  agricultural  biotech  industry which  up to  now has  only 
introduced very few and simple genetically modified traits (mostly herbicide resistance) and 
has not worked so much on features such as salt resistance, drought resistance, or nitrogen 
fixation which are more promising from a general welfare perspective.
- In contrast most notably to Personal Property, for IP there exists no spontaneous and natural 
exclusion because most people feel free to give away copies and because the value of IP 
comes  from  circulation  and  not  from  possession.  Exclusion,  even  if  on  clear  cut  legal 
grounds, proves therefore often hardly enforceable. This is true also for seeds, particularly 
because infringement is not easily detectable there and because pollen or seeds may be spread 
unintendedly and inadvertendly. 
1 There may be some common ground if the connection between creators and consumers is closer, e.g. in the case of 
books or music products.
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overdiversification  of  goods,  fetishism with  labels,  property  aspirations  on  generic  names  and 
symbols  and  deliberate  brand  piracy  are  not  so  relevant  for  our  subject.  Notably,  criticism 
concerning  private  property  is  not  at  stake  in  our  case,  because  the  naming  and  labelling  of 
ingredients  and  food  is  a  public  issue.  But  two  general  intricacies  apply  (Zarrilli  et  al.  1997; 
Furlough/Strikwerda 1999; OECD 1998): 
- There are so many logos,  labels and names that  consumers or even purchasing agents  of 
distribution companies might be misled. This is the reason why different "non GM" "bio" or 
"organic" labels along the production chain may be misinterpreted in its contend and scope. 
Furthermore  the  declaration  may  be  wrong  because  of  diverging  standards,  inadvertent 
contamination, complicate procedures with accompanying documents, and lack of adequate 
testing methods.  Authenticity  labels  such as  geographical  indications  may be problematic 
because cultural identities of people, traditional production methods and spatial relations are 
always hetergeneous and dynamic, thus implicating similar problems as with other claims of 
cultural property (e.g. Kasten 2004). 
- Established labels and names may function as a market entrance barrier because there are 
different  production  methods  and  standards  established  all  over  the  world.  Furthermore 
protected origins  may work as  xenophobic  signals  on their  home markets.  Ecolabels  and 
labels concerning social standards of production (e.g. child labour) are debated particularly by 
authors  from  developing  countries  who  see  them  often  as  protectionistic  because  these 
countries  cannot meet  them for structural  reasons.  The World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
allows mandatory labelling requirements only for different qualities of products but not for 
the production process as such which should not be dictated by the importing country. This 
was one of the reasons why the US and other GM producing countries suited the EU for its 
GM labelling policy before the WTO tribunal – in the case of approved genetic modifications, 
they see the crops as "substantial equivalent" (Scherzberg 2006; Seifert 2006).
It can be summarized that intangible property seems to be burdened with more complications and 
legitimation  problems  than  material  property  forms  and  that  these  problems  become  more 
politicised now as the postindustrial creation of value puts more stress on Intellectual and Brand 
Property Rights. 
Claiming Intellectual  Property  Rights  on  GM crops:  Biotech Industry  versus  Traditional 
Farmer Privileges
With the "Knowledge Society" becoming the official self description of the postindustrial countries, 
the US and to a lesser extend also the EU are fighting for stricter and internationally more binding 
IPR (Meier 2005). One reason is the fear to loose ground on newly industrialising countries because 
of the wage difference, the other is the emergence of better copying devices and reverse engineering 
methods to multiply contend or to crack the "natural" protection of tangible goods. With the demise 
of  the  Socialist  Block  and  the  New Economy boom,  liberal  ideas  about  free  markets  and  the 
efficiency of private property arose to seemingly unique ideological power (Soederberg et al. 2006). 
Biotechnology gained strong IPR protection, particularly within the US jurisdiction. In the famous 
Diamond vs.  Chakrarbarty  case  in 1980 the US Supreme Court  ruled an  oil  digesting bacteria 
patentable "as anything under the sun that is made by man" (447 U.S. 303). The following wave of 
patenting in biotech research blurred – at least in the eyes of critiques – the distinction between 
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been not so eager in the expansion of IPR and biotech patents – one may speculate that this might 
be  due  to  the  fact  that  the  leading  European  industry  sectors,  particularly  the  mechanical 
engineering branch, are based not so much on explicit IPR but on other appropriation strategies 
such as trade secrets, implicit knowledge and long term contracts (Casper/Soskice 2004).
Behind  the  scene  of  IPR  expansion,  new  social  movements  and  new  players  emerged  in 
propagating and creating initiatives for an open information society such as Open Source Software, 
Wikipedia and Open Access to  scientific  literature.  Meanwhile  also an "Open Source Biology" 
movement  is  evolving,  making findings and research tools  available  in  open access  forms and 
looking for business models which are independent of IPR. The parallel to Open Source Software 
comes up even more strikingly if one takes into account that DNA and protein research is conceived 
of in terms which are delineated from informatics and that molecular biology is merging to a certain 
extend with the computer hardware and software design on which it is based. The hope is now that 
Open Source Biology is making freely available otherwise licensed research tools for universities, 
smaller  companies  and  for  developing  countries  thus  cracking  up  the  present  concentration  of 
biotech  research  in  the  hands  of  a  few multinationals,  steering  it  to  more  project  and  market 
diversification, and addressing the needs of the poor (Hope 2004). 
The development of legal regulations follows rather coherently the ideological debates. Up to the 
1960's,  plant  breeding  research  had  been  done  mostly  in  the  public  sector.  With  the  Green 
Revolution Plant Breeding Rights were introduced as a private IPR but with two exemptions on 
exclusivity: Other breeders were allowed to use the variety for further breeding, and farmers were 
allowed to reproduce seeds for replanting them in the following years  (Santaniello  et  al.  2000; 
Kloppenburg 2004). With the advent of biotechnology it became possible to isolate, modify and 
transfer single genes, and with the mentioned expansion of patent rights, biotechnology firms can 
aspire  now IPR on these  genes  accordingly.  This  confers  to  them IPR on all  plants  and their 
offsprings  which are containing that  gene,  thus  rendering the mentioned Plant  Breeding Rights 
exemptions obsolete for GM traits. The Canadian Supreme Court in 2004 supported this stance in 
the case Monsanto vs. Schmeisser, but only barely with five votes against four, the latter dissenting 
on the grounds "that higher life forms, including plants, are not patentable" (S.C.R. 902, 2004 SCC 
34, p.49). 
But IPR not only apply to domestic farming in the United States and Canada. With the WTO's 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) treaty they are extended on all WTO 
members, at least on paper. Most developing countries are accepting the TRIPS only grudgingly 
and in bargain for better export opportunities into US and EU markets. Conversely they put their 
hope on revenues from "farmer's rights" as they are stated in the global Convention on Biological 
Diversity.  Farmers'  Rights  should  compensate  for  the  fact  that  most  genetic  material  for  plant 
breeding  was  cultivated  by  generations  of  farmers  in  tropical  and  subtropical  countries  but 
consensus on their implementation seems out of reach (Awuku 2005; Jungcurt/Meyer 2006).
If we now look to the different aspects of the practical realisation of biotech IPR, we have first to 
consider the  economic situation. Studies on GM crops are contentious with regard to savings of 
inputs,  yields,  and profitability (ECC 2001; Benbrook 2002; Brookes/Barfoot 2005; FoE 2007). 
Hence the area planted with GM crops seems to be growing, especially in the United States (54% of 
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times before 2000 (ISAAA 2006; cf. FoE 2007: 7f. for comment). Supposing that the expansion is 
at least partly driven by productivity gains on labour or capital, and not only due to market power of 
oligopolistic agro-industrial companies, then the question arises how the rents are distributed. As 
long  as  the  GM  seeds  are  protected  by  patents,  the  biotechnology  companies  are  charging  a 
"technology fee", i.e. a higher price for their seeds, to get returns on their R&D-investments. The 
investments to develop and propagate GM plants have driven the biotech and seed industry in a 
strong and ongoing concentration (ECC 2001; Kuyek 2005). But not all  profits  go to the agro-
industrial companies. The farmers that first move into GM crops get some surplus from saved input 
costs or higher yields. However, as competition strengthens over time, commodity prices will fall, 
thus bringing down the first mover advantage and reducing GM gains to zero. The farmers that do 
not go into the GM business will be the effective losers with falling farmgate prices, whereas the 
distributors or consumers in the long run – when patents are expiring – theoretically will capture the 
full advantage of the technology (Price et al. 2003; Demont et al. 2005; Sunding/Zilberman 2001).2 
Since  early  adopters  are  normally  large  farmers  whereas  small  farmers  most  often  being  the 
"laggards", the political positions of farmers' associations and crops producing countries is strongly 
influenced by the representation of the former vs. the latter. As far as the increased cultivation of 
GM  crops  is  due  to  oligopolistic  market  power  of  biotech  companies  – as  insinuated  by 
environmental NGOs (e.g. FoE 2007) – the GM farmers would get no profits at all, and could even 
loose ground to their competitors by subsidising useless innovations. 
So  far,  the  situation  does  not  differ  from other  technological  innovations.  But  we  have  to 
consider the  physical intricacies of plants and crops: in contrast to all non-biological goods, they 
have  natural  mechanisms  for  aggressive  selfreplication  and  selfpropagation  in  form of  asexual 
germination,  pollen  flow  and  seed  drift.  With  the  wind,  with  animal  or  human  transportation 
reproductive material can spread over very wide distances. On the one hand selfreplication makes 
exclusion hard to control  – with the need for measures which may prove counterproductive for 
public  relations.  Monsanto,  the  largest  biotech  company,  sells  its  products  accompanied  by  a 
"Technological Agreement" which binds farmers not to save seeds for the next year. Compliance is 
monitored by inspectors which take samples from the margins of the fields for genetic analysis. 
Furthermore a Monsanto hotline encourages neighbours to report infringements. Thus some farmers 
were brought to court while others settled their cases extrajudicial by paying fines  (Moeller/Sligh 
2005; Kershen 2004).
In the same moment selfpropagation means that IPR protected genes are not only on the field 
during the period where they have been planted purposely, but they crop up also in times and places 
where they are not intended, often not adverted, and perhaps even not allowed. Thus there were 
arising fears that even those farmers may be litigated who never intentionally purchased GM seeds. 
If these fears would prove to be true, patents in combination with strong pollen flow as e.g. in 
canola would confer a rather unusual monopoly to the IPR owners and put a strange technology 
dictate on the farmers: They would have to purchase the GM seeds anyway to avoid litigation! But 
since thus far no cases in this direction have been reported, one may ask whether the ongoing debate 
2 With higher yields per acreage the land rent will drop, whereas higher labour productivity has seldom and only 
indirect impacts on the profitability of the land.
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is  consciously  or  unconsciously  demonising  the  Monsanto  vs.  Schmeisser  judgement  in  this 
respect.3 Yet the selfpropagation might induce at least some real Lock-in effects for farmers or 
whole regions: They can perhaps nevermore switch to non-GM production if pollen and seed drift is 
persistent (Soil Association 2002). 
Why is non-GM a matter of concern? The cultural valuation of "natural" food is not entirely new 
since the food industry advertised images of naturalness from its beginnings – more often than not 
to conceal the real denaturalisation. The biotech industry too tried to give its products a 'green' 
image but failed to do so in Europe and Japan where GM food were associated with unnaturalness 
and risk (Gill 2003). As consumers and retailers blocked the import of GM derived food, notably 
after the BSE crisis, segregation became necessary and identity preserved non-GM crops received a 
premium value which was based on the existence of and risk associated with the GM crops. Thus, 
ironically, the GM industry is generating value perhaps not so much directly with its own modified 
crops but indirectly with the crops which are segregated from the perceived threat.
Corresponding to the problems that GM crops are engendering, the social relations between IPR 
holders  and  GM  farmers  as  material  property  owners  became  tense  and  conflictual.  With  its 
"Technological Agreement" Monsanto prevents the growers not only from saving seeds. They have 
to channel the crop to markets where the GM variety is legally approved, they should be aware that 
the pollen flow from their fields may damage neighbouring crops, they have to cultivate the crop 
according technical advices from Monsanto which should avoid ecological problems such as insects 
becoming  resistant  against  BT transferred  crops.  On  the  other  hand  Monsanto  is  giving  some 
limited  warranty  for  performance  provided  the  farmers  has  also  purchased  the  complementary 
herbicide from Monsanto (whose patent  on the herbicide has run out,  making generic products 
available).  Farmers have to allow full access to their records at public administration bodies, at seed 
sellers, and to their own documents for Monsanto to  control compliance with the Agreement,  even 
after the farmer has stopped growing Monsanto's seeds. Thus they have waived all their privacy rights. 
They accept all the terms of the so called Agreement – which is written in very fine letters, literally as 
the "small print" – by signing it or simply opening a bag of Monsanto's seed. All legal disputes have to 
be settled in St. Louis, Missouri (Monsanto's headquarters) – and thus according to Missouri state law – 
regardless of where the farmer lives (Monsanto 2006). The GM input into their fields means that the 
farmers  are  loosing  much of  the  control  over  their  business  and  are  becoming  to  a  certain  extend 
contract  labourers  of  the  biotech  industry,  but  in  a  rather  asymmetrical  fashion,  since  most  of  the 
economic risks of production fall on themselves. 
But this description only applies to the situation in the US and Canada, not to Argentina where much 
of Monsanto's GM crops, and particularly transgene soya, is grown (FoE 2007: 23ff.).  In Argentina 
Monsanto could neither effectively establish nor enforce IPR on its GM seeds – hence GM soy farmers 
seed purchasing costs per hectare amount only to 3 to 4 US$ in contrast to 15 to 17 US$ in the United 
States (Brookes/Barfoot 2005: 188). But some have asked whether Monsanto really pressed very hard to 
enforce exclusion, as the planting and export of GM soy all over the country and the illegal import to 
Brazil may help to convince Latin America of GM crops, thus conquering a possible non-GM importer 
3 The Supreme court's decision against Percy Schmeisser was based on the fact that the court came to the judgement, 
undisputed within the jury, that tests on Schmeisser's fields revealed a concentration of 95 to 98 % herbizide 
resistant seeds. Probably this concentration is due to the fact that Schmeisser intendedly and actively selected 
Round-Up tolerant canola which was blown on his fields (S.C.R. 902, 2004 SCC 34).
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for the EU and Japan. In this respect the situation can be compared to a certain extend with free releases 
of commercial software  – as e.g. Netscape's internet browser or Adobe Acrobat Reader  – which may 
engendering the need for complementary goods or causing Lock-ins with the customers which may be 
exploited  later  on  (e.g.  Kelly  1998).  The  impression  of  a  second  thought  IPR  strategy  is  further 
mounting if one takes into account that the US government engaged in strong public relations battle 
against South African countries which rejected food aid on the grounds that the provided grain would be 
mostly GM and probably replanted by local farmers, thus rendering the local seed pool contaminated 
and in consequence preventing exports to the EU (Zerbe 2004). It came also a little bit at surprise how 
fast and lightly Monsanto and other biotech companies at first gave up in the debate over "Terminator" 
and similar "genetic use restriction technologies" (GURT) which were developed to guaranty IPRs by 
making the plants sterile. One may interpret that the gratis distribution of GM is consciously taken into 
account and accepted by biotech proponents in the hope that they are able to capture some royalties in a 
second step.4 Now, Monsanto is  trying to charge European importers  of Argentinian GM soy.  And 
GURTs are propagated again, nowadays as a mean to protect the environment and non-GM fields from 
GM contamination (Daniell 2002; Genewatch 2005).
Thus selfreplication and selfpropagation of plants may work in favour of spreading out GM 
traits, and perhaps even in favour of private IPR. But the potential scope of IPR might further be 
diminished by biotech crop research  in Developing Countries  which is  done mostly  within the 
public  domain  – or  by more  natural  alternatives  to  biotech  crops  (Cohen  2005;  Pearce  2001). 
Notably China is highly engaged in originating GM crops with the prospect to distribute the seeds 
under traditionally Plant Breeder Rights, thus promising low overall seed costs and non-restrictive 
technology transfer, making them available especially to plant breeders in the Developing World 
(Keeley 2003). With lower labour costs, emerging market countries like Brazil and Argentina may 
become strong competitors to the US and Canada on the bulk markets for food, feed and renewable 
raw materials (OECD/FAO 2005), hence pressing farmgate prices further down and driving still 
more farmers out of business in high wage countries – at least as long as those try to compete in 
fordistic bulk strategies (Ploeg 2006). The US agri-food paradigm may be based on the idea to 
function as the "breadbasket of the world" (Morgan et al. 2006: 36ff.), and many features of the 
introduction of GM crops may be interpreted accordingly. But it is not at  all clear whether it  will 
prove effective to defend the latter position. 
Evolving  Brand  Property  Rights  on  Non-GM  crops:  NGOs,  Retailers,  Authorities  and 
Farmers blocking the use of GM crops
In  a  rather  general  sense  postfordistic  tendencies  are  the  consequence  of  growing  household 
incomes  in  affluent  milieus,  but  postfordism  does  not  determine  which  industry  sectors  are 
concerned – food, housing, transport etc. – and in which directions they get pulled by consumer 
demand: Either new goods may be invented, or old ones may be provided with more quality or a 
renewed  authenticity,  depending  on  cultural  preferences.  As  postindustrial  societies  are  getting 
socially and culturally heterogeneous (e.g. Miller 1995), all national stereotypes are getting even 
more problematic than ever before. But to a certain extend one can still find different tendencies in 
the EU in contrast to the US, with EU consumers more urban, more quality, and more authenticity 
4 Perhaps Monsanto kept the GM seed price low for another reason - mainly to make money from sales of the 
herbicide, whose patent would soon expire (Les Levidow, personal communication).
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orientated  and US buyers  more  suburban  and more  keen  on  quantity  and technical  innovation 
(Morgan et al. 2006). Correspondingly the attitudes concerning food and food policies differ what 
perhaps most incisively may be demonstrated with the handling of raw milk cheese which has early 
been prevented in the US on grounds of the natural risk of becoming infested with listeria, whereas 
in the EU a similar regulation from the EU Commission met with strong resistance in Spain, Italy 
and  most  notably  in  France  (Swardson  1999).  On  the  other  hand  many  Europeans  are  rather 
fearsome with synthetic food additives which are of no concern in the US (Caplan 1997; Marsden et 
al. 2000). One may say that on the one side there is to be found a science and innovation orientated 
model of safety and health, whereas on the other side nature coupled with traditional production is 
the paradigm,  thus  explaining  also culturally  different  notions of  risk  (Gill  2003).  The general 
revalorisation of nature and traditional rural life has to be seen in this context, with its consequences 
on food demand, green housing and ecotourism which may counter and compensate for the agro-
industrial  devalorisation  and  depopulation  of  rural  regions  (Penker  2005;  Laschewski  2006). 
Accordingly the EU policy is changing now from former productivist strategies to 'multifunctio­
nality'. Most of the food scandals in the newer past have been built on the perceptions that agro-
industrial business causes a lot of problems which more natural and traditional food production does 
not. In this vein, notably the BSE scandal triggered very much of the European reaction on the 
introduction of GM crops on the market, changing the relaxing attitudes concerning GM regulation 
since the early 1990ties to the total opposite and setting the ideological stage for the current legal 
situation (Levidow/Boschert 2007). 
To be  sure,  the  relatively  restrictive  risk  regulation  of  GM crops within  the  EU was never 
intended to establish Brand Property Rights and better economic opportunities for non-GM crops. 
On the contrary the EU Commission and many European governments most of the time worked in 
favour  of  GM technologies.  Restrictions  were  mostly  intended  to  win citizens  and particularly 
consumer acceptance. That the non-GM attitude might have some specific economic merits was not 
recognised until very recently, even not by the environmentalists who for a long time accepted the 
common ideas about  the correspondence of innovations,  growth and jobs.  Only presently some 
agricultural economists are explicating the sectoral benefits of the non-GM stance (e.g. Gray et al. 
2004; Schmitz 2004; Veyssiere/Giannakas 2006). However the germ of particular BPR lays in the 
EU regulation  philosophy which  never  accepted  the  "substantial  equivalence"  claim of  the  US 
regulatory system on GM crops (Thorpe/Robinson 2004). In the EU regulatory system, the whole 
crop is being seen as altered – and not only a particular trait, such as herbicide tolerance, being 
added to a plant which, apart from that, rests the same. Therefore – in contrast to the US – special 
laws on genetic engineering were issued and the Precautionary Principle was established that GM 
crops should be monitored even in the absence of concrete and calculable risk assumptions. 
From this point on, it is a rather logical consequence to see GM crops and non-GM crops as 
different things in the world. Accordingly politicians and authorities in the EU put forward the idea 
of  "Coexistence"5 thus  transforming  a  political  all-or-non  conflict  on  risk  into  an  economical 
competition between niche markets.  Mandatory labelling was introduced for GM traits to make 
segregation possible, allowing for a 0,9% impurity threshold. One may ask why the burden of the 
label was put on GM (and not on identity-preserved crops), but from the EU perspective this seems 
5 Ironically "Co-existence" is, though probably not intended, reminiscent of Cold War terminology 
(Levidow/Boschert 2006). 
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to follow the general risk perception and is consistent with regulations concerning food additives 
which are not prevented but have to be declared. Hence the generic name as a common BPR was 
reserved  for  the  non-modified  crops.  In  consequence  different  EU  countries  have  introduced 
regulations concerning the cultivation of GM which demand e.g. in Germany the public registration 
of fields with GM crops and provide for liability rules to protect farmers who want to preserve their 
crops from contamination with GM pollen, seeds and volunteers. Neighbouring farmers and whole 
regions  declared  themselves  as  "GM  free  zones"  and  many  supermarket  chains  committed 
themselves not to take any products with (direct) GM contend onto their shelves. Some countries, 
most notably Austria,  have released national bans against several GM varieties which had been 
approved in the EU. But up to now, GM free zones and bans within the EU are more a sort of 
political manifestation (remember the "nuclear  weapon free zones") than an economic decision, 
because most farmers would not grow GM plants anyway as a consequence of demand restrictions 
and interference with neighbours. Only in Spain some noteworthy amount of GM maize has been 
cultivated, yet presently the GM acreage is growing to a certain extend also in other EU countries. 
In addition GM crops, mainly soybeans, are imported to a rather large amount as fodder in the EU 
meat  production  industry  (FoE  2007:  70ff.).  The  US,  Canada  and  Argentina  successfully 
complained at the WTO about the EU regulations as offending Liberal Trade, but even if the EU 
Commission  and  the  member  countries  are  streamlining  some  regulations  accordingly,  most 
restrictions will be upheld (Seifert 2006; Scherzberg 2006). Since the EU is powerful enough to 
ignore sanctions, the more probable consequence of the WTO suit might be that other nations could 
be deterred to follow the EU policy. 
To see the undeclared BPR issue more clearly, one should also take a look on the EU regulation 
about  ecolabels  and  about  protected  geographical  indications  (Karpenstein/Werres  2004; 
Babcock/Clemens 2004). Since these regulations are not based directly on risk but on consumer 
preferences, the difference lays in the fact that the label signals some sort of premium quality and is 
put on the commodities which have to be actively segregated and not on the bulk commodities. 
With this little differential the BPR context is rather similar – and similarly not undisputed. The EU 
explicitly  states  in  the  preamble  of  the  protected  origin  regulation  that  this  label  might  confer 
"benefit  to  the  rural  economy,  particularly  in  less-favoured  or  remote  areas,  by improving  the 
incomes of farmers and by retaining the rural population in these areas." (EC 510/2006: L93/12) 
Not surprisingly, this regulation too has provoked a complaint, brought before the WTO by the US 
and Australia, and even though the EU changed its regulation in consequence of the advice of the 
panel, the dispute is currently ongoing, highlighting the general conflict between the fordistic bulk 
commodity strategy and the 'multifunctional' European food model.6 
As it seems to be the case with other Intangible Property Rights, the practical implementation 
and enforcement of BPR in identity preserved non-GM food is not easy. First of all we have to look 
again at the physical intricacies, the intermingling (or "contamination") on the successive stages of 
the production and distribution chain, tightly coupled with the declaration and testing complexities 
which arise here with seed impurities, cross-pollination, volunteers and harvesting-storage practices. 
On the  acres,  it  is  mostly  the already mentioned  self-replication  and self-propagation of  plants 
which jeopardizes the purity of the seeds and of the crops. From the farmgate on, most transport, 
6 see webpage of the WTO (http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds174_e.htm)
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storage  and  manufacture  of  crops  was  designed  on  large  scale  handling,  making  it  somewhat 
difficult to readopt to smaller and separated batches. Since GM varieties cannot be distinguished 
visually, one needs biochemical tests which take their time, their costs and also at least some hint on 
the particular genetic modifications in question. Processed food, as it becomes more and more usual 
for convenience, is based on the concoct of many ingredients, thus making it rather difficult to trace 
all their origins. The problem is aggravated with the degree of purity requested. Wholesalers may 
decide to declare commodities as "containing GM" on the basis of ignorance to avoid tests even if 
this is not allowed for, or they may declare it as "GM" though they have evidence to the contrary, 
simply to make non-GM batches more rarely, thus realizing higher prices (Benedikt Haerlin, Save 
our Seeds, personal communication).
From the economical perspective, the regulation within the EU puts a certain burden of costs on 
GM products, at first on the biotech firms to get market approval, secondly on the GM farmers who 
take some part of the segregation costs which otherwise – with voluntary labelling of non-GM – 
would have been placed entirely on the shoulders of the identity preservation channel. With the 
current impurity threshold of 0,9%, the costs of segregation are estimated at five to ten percent for 
different crops and field structures (Bock et al. 2002; Messean et al. 2006). Adding some percent 
cost reduction for GM production, identity preserved crops sell at a price difference of zero to ten 
percent on the level of wholesalers. But since most food products with possible GM contend – 
mostly soy, maize, canola – are processed and since there is a long value adding way through the 
retail sector anyway, the resulting price difference at the supermarket cash desk would be much 
lower.  As  it  is  known in  general,  with  the  ever  larger  amount  of  processing,  distributing  and 
catering costs (Bunte 2006: 39; Penker 2006), differences of farmgate costs are diminishing in their 
relative size to the overall prices for end-consumers. To give a not too fictitious example: If the 
farmgate purchasing costs differ 10 percent, but represent only up to a quarter in the value adding 
chain, then the final difference will be 2,5 percent and thus will probably submerge in other price 
signals. 
This is the economic situation in which retailer chains in the EU decided to ban GM containing 
products from their shelves – as a low cost and high public relation value measure to compensate 
for the complaints about forcing low prices and consequently low production standards on farmers 
(Gill  2003: 235ff.).  Only avoiding GM feed in meat  production is not so easy,  given the large 
amount  of  corn and soya  needed to rear  livestock under  agro-industrial  conditions.  Correspon­
dingly, up to now the anti-GM lobby was not so successful in forcing supermarkets into boycotting 
meat from GM fed animals. This gives some hint that most consumer's willingness to pay for non-
GM is  probably  heterogeneous,  taking  into  account  that  the  more  decided  (and  perhaps  more 
affluent) consumers would change to eco-products anyway,  a sector which is expanding rapidly 
now (Kontoleon/Yabe 2006). But since eco-labels have to avoid GM in any case, it is helpful for 
them to be shielded by the much larger conventional sector. 
As the reader may already have guessed from the previous descriptions socio-cultural relations 
are  rather  ambivalent  and  complex  within  this  brand  property  collective,  consisting  of  NGOs, 
retailers, farmers and authorities. Besides the environmentalist NGOs, all over organisations have to 
cope with conflicting interest within its own rows: The authorities have to comply with WTO and 
EU law, with many of its members being convinced of the benefits of GM anyhow, but being at the 
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same time eager to appease public protests and to avoid consumer scandals. The farmer associations 
are caught in the general problem of representing a small number of economically very powerful 
agro-industrial  members  with at  least  some affinity  towards GM and on the other  side a  large 
number of smallholders to whom the GM introduction poses much higher transaction costs and 
which are more reluctant due to higher dependence on neighbour relations and on a 'green image' 
for multiuse agriculture (cf. Beckmann et al. 2006). The retailers, though taking sides against GM 
food rather early, are on the other hand addicts to low prices and at this issue confronted with the 
uncertainty how the non-GM prices will develop over time, taking into account that wholesalers 
prices may increase significantly if more and more farmers would switch to GM production. And 
clearly, all these groups are 'strange bedfellows' to each other, with the NGOs and farmers usually 
fighting against the large retailers, the NGOs and large farmer associations normally in clinch over 
environmental and food quality. But in this case they are band together by the intangible power of 
the public discourse and its risk narrative (cf. Hajer 1995). Hence, in the beginning there was much 
uncertainty  on  whether  the  non-GM stance  could  work,  but  with  experience  and  mutual  trust 
evolving, the non-GM vertically integrating network presently seems to be rather firmly established 
(Teuscher et al. 2005; cf. Ondersteijn et al. 2006). 
Conclusion and Future Perspectives
In this article, the conflict about GM crops was analysed from a sociologically informed property 
rights perspective. Property rights were taken as a lens to operationalise the theoretical concept of 
the postindustrial knowledge economy and to analyse in empirical detail the forces and barriers 
which  support  and impede  the  theoretically  conjectured  shift  from tangible  to  intangible  value 
generation and trigger its organisation as either private or public. Results were summarised in the 
following chart (figure 2) 
Figure 2: Main features of the IPR versus BPR conflict (ideal type form)
IPR on GM crops BPR on identity preserved crops 
Ideological and 
cultural level
neoliberal market competition;
valorisation of hightech crops
postfordistic green consumerism;
valorisation of rural environments
Legal level IPR (plant patents) 
    vs. open source
BPR (mandatory labelling) 
     vs. free trade 
Social relations dominanted by biotech industry; 
competitive between farmers
dominanted by retailer chains; 
cooperative between farmers
Economic valuation increased labour efficiency: profits 
for biotech industry and early 
adopting farmers; later on some­
what lower consumer prices 
image of authenticity: profits for 
retailers and farmers; higher farmgate 
and consumer prices (the latter may 
not be relevant in the value chain)
Physical implementa­
tion problems 
seeds may be bred without consent 
of the IPR holder
segregation hard to implement in long 
and complex value chains
Physical externalities' 
problems 
contamination of  identity-
preserved crops
no problems
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With focus on the economic dynamic in general we can state from our analysis that the move from 
tangible to intangible production is twofold. On the one side, as it concerns the propagation of GM 
crops, it is embedded in a productivist bulk commodity strategy which is extending and reinforcing 
industrialist developments. The present GM traits such as herbicide tolerance or insect tolerance 
have to be seen as process innovations which enhance labour productivity but do not change the 
quality of the products, at least not in a positively perceived direction. Since farmers, in contrast e.g. 
to  industrial  labour  power,  are  too  fragmented  to  gain  market  power  and  since  markets  for 
agricultural bulk materials are mostly saturated, the productivity gain in the long run leads to lower 
farmgate prices with the rent going to some other, more concentrated sector in the value adding 
chain, or with market power absent, directly to the consumer. As with other technological inputs in 
the past, the necessary farm labour and farmer's income diminish, kicking still more farmers out of 
business (see figure 3, IPR strategy). 
Figure 3: IPR and BPR strategies' value adding effects in comparison
On the other side, as it concerns the propagation of identity preserved non-GM crops, the move to 
intangible property is embedded within a consumerist strategy which is essential for postindustrial 
and postfordistic developments even if its more general features have been noted since the start of 
the market economy as such (see figure 3, BPR strategy). The identity preservation is to be seen as 
a product innovation since it guarantees quality vis-a-vis the bulk market which is seen from a part 
of  the consumers  as delivering diminished quality.  On the basis  of  this  consumer preference a 
premium relatively to the decreasing bulk market price is paid, firstly for sustaining the old quality 
by  not  using  GM  traits,  and  secondly  for  the  remaining  part  of  the  segregation  costs  which, 
depending  mostly  on  the  regional  liability  situation,  is  not  assumed  by  the  GM  sector. 
Correspondingly the amount of farm labour is not reduced and this might be in the interest  of 
vibrant rural communities. 
What  might  be  the  probable  outcome  of  this  struggle  between  the  productivist  and  the 
bulk farming mass processing, retailing, cateringGM seeds
identity preserved farming labelled processing and retailing, individualized cateringlow input
BPR premium strategy: farms and food sector re-expanding their share of consumer expenditures
IPR bulk strategy: cost-price-squeeze on farms, shrinking food expenditures
percentage of consumer expenditure
percentage of consumer expenditure
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consumerist strategy in the future? On the hand the consumerist strategy clearly operates "at the 
long end of the lever" of the value adding chain, with the mounting value share of the processing, 
retailing  and  catering  branch  and  with  the  retailer  market's  concentration  based  market  power 
relatively to the raw materials production sector. Hence the consumer markets are getting more and 
more grips to decide what farms should grow and this keeps true independent of the market power 
of the biotech industry vis-a-vis the farmers. Given the strong competition amongst the farmers, the 
market power of biotech industry can gain no influence on the value chain beyond the farmgate, 
thus being condemned to capture its share from the shrinking crop value. 
But on the other hand the biological selfreplication, selfpropagation and persistence of crops 
may work in favour of the productivist strategy, making GM traits almost ubiquitous on farmland, 
thus  perhaps  strongly  increasing  the  level  of  segregation  costs,  at  least  if  there  are  no  larger 
cultivation zones which organise to keep themselves GMO free from the beginning. With larger 
segregation costs the price difference may trigger down the market share of the identity preserved 
crops, and, enhanced by economies of scale effects, this may lead into a selfreinforcing cycle which 
may be able to counterbalance the strong forces of the retailer's demand. For these reasons it is 
probably wise to expect further partitioning between bulk and identity preserved crops, the latter 
with a prominent share on markets for more affluent consumers and for food, and inversely the 
former more relevant for renewable raw materials and for feed. 
Within  the  productivist  and the  consumerist  strategy,  Intellectual  Property Rights  (IPR) and 
Brand Property Rights (BPR) play more or less decisive roles. Private IPRs are jeopardized on the 
one hand by the selfreplication mechanism of plants and on the other side by competing farmer's 
right, a conflict which is decided differently in different legal arenas. Private IPR protection might 
prove essential as an incentive for private investment into GM crop development, but since public 
investment is on the verge in Developing Countries, the further propagation of the GM strategy 
depends perhaps more on its overall technological benefits and ecological effects and not on IPR. 
Thus IPR only decides on private investment and appropriation shares, but not on the fate of the 
productivist strategy as such. However for the consumerist strategy of identity preservation, BPR 
are  constitutive  and  essential.  They  are  jeopardized  on  the  one  hand  by  the  selfpropagation 
mechanism of plants and on the other side by competing free trade rights, a conflict which too is 
decided differently, notably in US versus EU legal arenas. As common rights, they are a relatively 
new mechanism, since usually BPR are installed as private brands and trade marks, based more on 
reputation and on advertisement evoked illusions, and not on collective contracts and controls. For 
public labels, credibility is probably more important and in the same moment more precarious to 
sustain than for private BPR, given the heterogeneous interests and cultural orientations which have 
to be coordinated within the label's vertical network. How this works exactly and how the benefits 
are distributed remains a field of further investigation, but with the consumerist strategy becoming 
more expansive, also the relevance of public BPR will increase – notably within the food sector 
where the origin of raw materials plays a salient role. 
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